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Abstract Human actions are often classiWed as either
internally generated, or externally speciWed in response to
environmental cues. These two modes of action selection
have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how
the mode of action selection aVects the subjective experi-
ence of action. We measured the experience of action using
the subjective compression of the interval between actions
and their eVects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants
performed either a left or a right key press, either in
response to a speciWc cue, or as they freely chose. More-
over, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly
cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or
participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each
action was followed by a speciWc tone. Participants judged
the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal
binding was found for both internally generated and for
stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding
depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing
of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding
was observed when both action choice and action timing
were internally generated or externally speciWed, compared
to conditions where the two parameters were selected by
diVerent routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–
eVect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding
is strongest when actions result from a single mode of
selection.
Introduction
Humans interact with their environment in at least two
diVerent ways, according to whether the pattern of behav-
iour is selected by the agents themselves, or speciWed by
external information.
One type of action is primarily performed in response to
environmental demands. Here, the selection of the action is
already implied by external information. For example we
usually stop at a crossing when the traYc light turns red.
Such actions are considered to be under stimulus control.
Arbitrary stimulus–action mappings can be established
through learning (e.g., Logan, 1988; Thorndike, 1911), or
by instructions which specify an intentional set (e.g., Brass,
Wenke, Spengler, & Waszak, 2009; De Houwer, Beckers,
Vandorpe, & Custers, 2005; Waszak, Wenke, & Brass,
2008; Wenke, Gaschler, & Nattkemper, 2007; Wenke,
Gaschler, Nattkemper, & Frensch, 2009). Once stimulus–
response (S–R) associations are established, external stimuli
trigger their associated re-actions more or less automati-
cally (Hommel, 2000; Woodworth, 1938).
In another type of action, agents themselves select an
appropriate action. Their selection normally aims to pro-
duce speciWc environmental eVects (Hommel, Müsseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Lotze, 1852; Prinz, 1997), or
to satisfy particular needs (Skinner, 1953). For example,
someone who remembers a friend’s birthday may select a
speciWc present with the intention of making the friend
happy. This class of actions have two distinguishing
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Psychological Research (2009) 73:602–612 603psychological characteristics: they involve internal genera-
tion of the action, and they involve mental representation of
the eVects of the action.
The brain regions involved in these two types of actions are
dissociable at least in part (Goldberg, 1985; also see Waszak,
Wascher, Keller, Koch, Aschersleben, & Rosenbaum,
2005). Responding to external stimuli predominantly recruits
a circuit involving the parietal lobes and the lateral premotor
areas (PMA). In contrast, internal action generation more
heavily relies on fronto-median brain areas including the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and cingulate motor
areas (CMA). Interestingly, diVerent brain systems are not
only involved in internal versus external decisions on what to
do (Cunnington, Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser, 2006;
Dirnberger, Fickel, Lindinger, Lang, & Jahanshahi, 1998;
Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006; Müller, Brass, Waszak, &
Prinz, 2007), but also in self-initiated versus externally trig-
gered timing of actions (i.e., in the decision regarding when
to act; Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, & Moser,
2002; Deiber, Manabu, Ibanez, Sadato, & Hallet, 1999;
Jahanshahi, Jenkins, Brown, Marsden, Passingham &
Brooks, 1995; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham &
Brooks, 2000; KrieghoV, Brass, Prinz, & Waszak, 2009).
The intentional and reactive routes to action necessarily
converge on a single motor execution system, which
Sherrington (1906) termed the ‘Wnal common path’. Thus,
both pre-SMA and premotor cortex initiate movements by
their projections to the primary motor cortex. Intentionally
selected and externally speciWed actions therefore have the
same kinematics (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). However, sur-
prisingly little is known about how the mode of selection
aVects the subjective experience of action. SpeciWcally,
only a few studies (Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, &
Prinz, 2002a; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002b; Haggard
& Clark, 2003; Repp & Knoblich, 2007; Sebanz & Lackner,
2007) directly investigated how the mode of action selec-
tion aVects the experience of being in control of one’s
actions and their eVects: the so-called sense of agency.
These studies appear to be generally consistent with the
intuitive prediction that intentional selection of an action
produces a more pronounced sense of agency than external
speciWcation of the same action.
We measured the experience of action using a temporal
binding eVect. Temporal binding refers to the Wnding that
actions are perceived to occur later, and their eVects (tones)
earlier, when voluntary actions are performed in an operant
context than in control conditions where the time of actions
or tones are judged in isolation (Haggard et al., 2002b).
That is, operant actions and their eVects are attracted
towards each other in perceived time. This temporal attrac-
tion eVect cannot be explained by mere contiguity-based
association of events, because it was absent when two sen-
sory events (i.e., two successive tones) or two motor events
(i.e., two successive keypresses) occurred separated by a
similar interval (Haggard et al., 2002a). Further, these tem-
poral shifts were reversed when tones followed TMS-
induced passive movements rather than voluntary actions
(Haggard et al., 2002b). Instead temporal binding seems
speciWc to intentional actions, and has therefore also been
termed “intentional binding” (Haggard et al., 2002b).
Aims of the study
So far, most of the studies on action experience (e.g.,
Haggard et al., 2002b; Haggard & Clark, 2003) manipu-
lated “voluntariness” by comparing active self-initiated
movements and passive involuntary movements. Therefore,
they do not allow any conclusions regarding how the mode
of action selection aVects action experience. The current
experiment addresses this issue directly by studying active
movements under various conditions of action selection
within the same task context.
Most previous studies investigating the functional and
neuronal basis of selection mode compared internally
generated and stimulus-driven action with respect to either
action selection (what-dimension; e.g., Herwig, Prinz, &
Waszak, 2007; Müller et al., 2007) or action timing (when-
dimension; e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 1995). In our study, by
contrast, both dimensions varied simultaneously and inde-
pendently. Participants performed either a left or a right key
press (action choice) in either the Wrst or the second of two
designated intervals (action timing). Participants made left
or right keypresses, either in response to a speciWc cue, or
as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress
could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two inter-
vals, or subjects freely chose in which interval to act. The
task is based on the paradigm introduced by KrieghoV et al.
(2009), and is summarized in Fig. 1.
Limiting the manipulation of timing selection to the
choice between two alternative intervals maximizes compa-
rability of the what- and the when-dimensions. However, in
our task participants always internally determined the time
point for initiating action within the designated interval,
independent of whether they internally choose the speciWc
interval, or whether the interval is speciWed by the cue.
Therefore, this task does not compare completely free with
completely Wxed selections, but instead systematically
varies the degree of internal generation required across the
two conditions.
Each keypress was followed by a tone. We used four
diVerent tones that were contingently mapped to the spe-
ciWc combination of the what and when parameters of an
action (i.e., a left keypress during the Wrst interval evoked
tone-1, a left keypress during the second interval tone-2,
etc.). Note that these action–eVect mappings remained
the same whether the selection of action was internally123
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tion of what and when-selection produced a speciWc out-
come, allowing us to directly compare how mode of
selection inXuences eVect prediction. Temporal binding
was assessed as in previous studies (Haggard et al., 2002b).
Participants monitored a rotating clock hand (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl 1983) while making a movement and/or
hearing a tone. They judged the time of movement or tone
onset in separate blocks. Comparing the perceived time of
movements in blocks where they evoked tones with blocks
without tones provides a measure of binding of actions to
eVects. Similarly, the perceived time of tones in blocks
where the participant evoked tones through their actions
was compared with blocks where tones occurred without
action to measure the binding of eVects to actions (see
“Methods”; Fig. 1).
This design allowed us to compare several hypotheses
regarding how selection mode might aVect temporal bind-
ing. These hypotheses are summarized in Fig. 2. On one
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), binding should be more pro-
nounced for internally selected than for stimulus-based
actions. This view reXects the folk notion of “free will”,
which links the sense of control to free selection between
alternative actions. If the overall degree of internality of
selection determines binding independent of dimension,
then most binding should be observed for completely inter-
nal actions, least binding for completely stimulus-cued
actions, and intermediate levels of binding in mixed selec-
tion conditions where either action identity or action timing
are speciWed by the cue, but not both (Fig. 2, 1a). Our
design also allowed us to compare whether selecting what
action to perform, or when to perform it had the greater
eVect on action experience. If binding depends on internal
selection of what action to perform (e.g., Herwig et al.,
2007; Herwig & Waszak, 2009; but see Hommel et al.,
2001, for a review of Wndings that demonstrated action–
eVect binding for externally chosen actions), then we
should observe more binding when participants can freely
choose between action alternatives than when the cue spec-
iWes the action (Fig. 2, 1b). Conversely, if temporal binding
primarily depends on internal timing of actions (e.g.,
Haggard et al., 2002b), then binding should be more
Fig. 1 Outline of the procedure. When the clock hand starts rotating a
symbolic cue signals which action to perform during the Wrst or the
second interval (shaded areas on the clock). The Wrst character of the
cue speciWed the what-dimension, and the second position the when-
dimension. In the example, participants are supposed to press the left
key during an interval of their choosing (external choice and internal
timing). In the operant movement and operant tone conditions,
participants’ movements were contingently followed by one of four
tones after 250 ms. Participants either judged the onset time of their
movements (operant movement) or of the tone (operant tone). In the
respective baseline conditions, participants judged either movement or
tone onset in isolation. Binding scores were determined by subtracting
judgement errors in the baseline conditions from judgement errors in
the operant conditions123
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ditions (Fig. 2, 1c).
An alternative “selection compatibility” hypothesis
(see Fig. 2, 2) predicts that temporal binding might
depend on a common mode of selection for what- and
when-information. That is, pronounced binding should
occur when the same route to action (i.e., either the inter-
nally generated route or the stimulus-driven route) con-
trols both action selection and action timing. By the same
token, one should observe less temporal binding when the
output of the two systems has to be combined in the
mixed mode conditions. This possibility is supported by
previous reports of interference between internally timed
and stimulus-triggered action (Astor-Jack & Haggard,
2005; Obhi & Haggard, 2004). For example, the reaction
time to make a simple response to an external trigger
stimulus is increased when the internal action system has
prepared to make the same action. Such interference does
not occur when the same system speciWes all parameters
of an action.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-three paid subjects (mean age 28.7 years,
SD = 11.01; 10 females) participated in the experiment
with local ethics committee approval.
Design and procedure
The procedure of the experiment was based on Haggard
et al. (2002b) and summarized in Fig. 1.
Participants rested their left and right index Wngers on
the response keys (F4 and F9 keys, respectively). They
faced a 17 in. screen, showing a small clock face marked at
5 ‘minute’ intervals (Libet et al., 1983; see Haggard et al.,
2002b, for details). The two response intervals were sig-
nalled by shaded areas on the clock face, each covering 16
‘minutes’ of the clock face.
The experimenter initiated rotation of a single clock
hand (length 12 mm), which moved clockwise with a
period of 2,560 ms. When the clock hand started to move a
cue was presented simultaneously above and below the
clock in 36 pt Arial font for 1,000 ms. The cue consisted of
two symbols separated by a blank space. The Wrst symbol
indicated that a left response (L), or that a right response
(R) was required, or that participants were free to decide
whether to make a left or right response (?). The second
symbol signalled in which interval the action should be
made. ‘1’ and ‘2’ signalled a response during the Wrst and
the second interval of the second clock rotation, respec-
tively, whereas a ‘?’ left the choice of the response interval
to the participant. There were thus four factorially arranged
conditions which diVered in how the keypress action was
selected, and how the time of action was selected. That is,
the selection of action alternative could be internal (internal
choice) or stimulus based (external choice). Similarly, the
time of action could be selected internally (internal timing)
or stimulus-based (external timing).
Depending on condition, participants’ pressed the left or
the right key during the Wrst or second interval and/or heard
one of four tones presented via loudspeakers connected to
the PC. All tones were of 60 ms duration and equal ampli-
tude. However, they diVered regarding pitch (450 and
590 Hz), and whether or not white noise was added to the
tone. Pitch was mapped to the what-dimension (i.e., left or
right keypress), and the noise dimension was associated
with action timing (Wrst or second interval). The assignment
of tones to speciWc hand–interval combinations was con-
stant for a given subject throughout the experiment, but was
counterbalanced across participants.
The clock hand continued to rotate for a randomly
chosen period between 1,500 and 2,500 ms after the
Fig. 2 Illustration of the predictions according to the diVerent hypoth-
eses. The x-axis shows the diVerent selection conditions, the y-axis the
expected amount of binding. 1 Internality matters: a Degree of inter-
nality matters, b Internal choice matters, c Internal timing matters.
2 Selection mode compatibility matters. See text for details
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experimental trials, subjects verbally reported the posi-
tion of the clock hand at which they experienced one of
two designated events once the clock had stopped (see
Fig. 1). Subjects were encouraged to make their reports
as accurate as possible, using unmarked and fractional
clock positions as required. The events judged were the
time of keypress movement or the onset time of the audi-
tory tone. Participants were told before each block which
event to judge.
Each participant performed four diVerent blocks of 80
trials each. Each block contained an equal number of tri-
als in each of the four selection conditions (Internal
choice and internal timing, internal choice and external
timing, external choice and internal timing, external
choice and external timing). Each action alternative and
each action interval was required equally often in exter-
nally speciWed trials. Trials within a block were presented
in random order.
Two of these four blocks are termed operant blocks,
because subjects’ keypresses caused a tone to occur after a
delay of 250 ms. The identity of the tone depended on the
key and the interval participants actually selected. On trials
where the subject was cued to make one action, but made
another in error, the tone depended on the action, not on the
cue. Subjects judged the time of the keypress in one of
these operant blocks and judged the time of tone onset in
the other (see Fig. 1).
The remaining two blocks were baseline blocks
designed to assess the temporal experience of actions and
their eVects when these occurred in isolation. Baseline
conditions were identical to operant conditions in every
way other than that each event (movements, tones)
occurred in isolation. In one baseline condition, subjects
made key-presses that were not followed by tones. They
were instructed to judge the perceived time of action (see
Fig. 1). In a second baseline block, they made no action,
but judged the onset of a tone (see Fig. 1). Tones in the
latter occurred at random latencies approximating the tim-
ing of subjects’ actions in the diVerent choice conditions.
In stimulus-triggered trials of the baseline block for tone
judgements they always heard the tone that was signalled
by the cue. In those trials with non-informative cues indi-
cating internal selection (‘?’) each tone appeared equally
often. Importantly, each baseline condition involved
either actions or their sensory eVects, but never the two in
conjunction.
Order of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects
with the following constraints: (1) The two blocks requiring
the same event to be judged (keypress or tone) always fol-
lowed each other. (2) The order of conditions (baseline,
operant) was the same for both judgements for a given
subject.
Prior to the time judgment tasks participants worked
through a practice block of 32 trials containing 8 trials of
each of the four selection modes. Practice trials diVered
from the time judgment task in the following ways: (a) Par-
ticipants were instructed to Wnd out which action produced
which tone; (b) Participants only experienced the operant
context in which their keypresses caused a tone; (c) They
received visual error feedback. The error feedback was pre-
sented after the tone and informed subjects whether they
had pressed the wrong key and whether they had pressed
during the wrong interval on stimulus-based trials, or
whether they had missed both intervals on any kind of trial;
(c) They did not have to judge the timing of any events.
They were informed that the practice block would be fol-
lowed by a memory test for the action-tone assignment.
A memory test followed the practice block in order to
ensure that participants had learned the mappings between
cues, actions and tones. The memory test consisted of two
sections in which each of the four tones was presented
twice. Participants either indicated verbally whether a given
tone was produced by a left or right key press action, or
they indicated whether it was associated with pressing dur-
ing the Wrst versus second interval. The order of these
judgements was randomized. Participants passed the mem-
ory test when they made no more than one error per section.
If they failed, they were given two further opportunities to
repeat the practice and the memory test.
Data analysis
Our analyses focussed on the judged time of events. For
each event, the judgement error was deWned as the diVer-
ence between the time that the event was reported to occur
using the clock, and the actual time at which it occurred. A
positive judgement error indicates a delay in event percep-
tion, while a negative judgement error indicates anticipa-
tion. First, we determined judgement errors for each
combination of the four selection conditions (internal
choice/internal timing etc.) and the two events judged
(movement, tone). Data are shown separately for operant
and baseline blocks in Table 1.
We then subtracted each participant’s mean judgment
error in each baseline condition from her/his mean judg-
ment error for the same event in the corresponding operant
conditions. This gives a measure of binding, for each com-
bination of selection and event.
Results
Four participants (mean age 40.4 years) did not pass the
memory test for action-tone assignments after three
consecutive runs and were excluded from the experiment.123
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stimulus-based trials during the experiment and were also
excluded. Finally, three further subjects were excluded
from the analyses because their judgements of event timing
using the clock were highly variable from trial to trial. Spe-
ciWcally, the standard deviation of judgements averaged
above 100 ms, across all selection conditions and both
judged events. The standard deviation of repeated event
judgements has been used previously to identify subjects
who perform particularly erratically in the cross-modal tim-
ing task (Haggard et al., 2002a). Note that this exclusion
criterion is independent of both overall mean judgement
error, and of diVerences between conditions in mean judge-
ment error.
The data of the remaining 16 subjects (6 females, mean
age 24.3 years, SD = 4.5) were processed as described
above. Only “correct” trials were analysed. That is, we
excluded a small number of trials in which subjects failed
to respond with the keypress or at the time speciWed by the
cue (1.0%). We also excluded trials in action conditions in
which participants failed to press a key during the second
rotation of the clock (0.9% of all trials).
On internal selection trials participants chose the right
key on 63% of the trials, and the left key on 37%, suggest-
ing that they preferred to press the key with their dominant
hand. This bias was similar for the judgements in the base-
line condition for movements (62%) as well as the operant
conditions for movements (65%) and tones (63%). The Wrst
and second intervals were internally chosen on 67 and 33%
of the trials, respectively, possibly indicating a boredom-
related bias against waiting until the second interval. Again,
this bias did not diVer between baseline movement trials
(68%), operant movement trials (69%), and operant tone
trials (64%).
Our analyses focussed on (a) binding scores, and (b) on
judgement errors in the baseline conditions (see Table 1).
For both types of analyses we collapsed the data across left
and right hands and across Wrst and second intervals.
Binding scores
Binding scores were analysed in two complementary ways.
First, we conducted ANOVAs on binding scores for each
judgement type (see “Mean Shifts” in Table 1) in order to
establish the overall pattern of results and to ensure that the
same pattern held for movement and tone judgements.
Second, we set up contrasts for overall binding scores (i.e.,
the sum of the absolute values of the binding scores in the 2
judgement conditions). Although the contrast analyses
correspond to a subset of the data in the ANOVA, we report
them because they allow the various hypothesis to be com-
pared directly using comparison contrasts (see below).
Analyses of variance
The omnibus ANOVA with judgement type (movement,
tone), mode of action choice (internal choice, external
choice), and mode of when-selection (internal timing,
external timing) as within-subjects factors yielded a signiW-
cant main eVect of judgement, F(1,15) = 45.68, p < 0.01,
MSE = 6,237.14. This arose because the shifts for the two
judgements were in opposite directions, in line with the
classic binding eVect. The perceived time of actions was
later (i.e., closer to tones) in operant blocks than in baseline
blocks, while the perceived time of tones was earlier (i.e.,
closer to actions) in operant blocks than in baseline blocks.
The only other signiWcant eVect was a three-way interaction
between the event judged, the mode of action choice, and
the mode of action timing on judgement, F(1,15) = 12.99,
p < 0.01, MSE = 351.79. Post hoc tests showed that overall
binding for completely stimulus-based actions did not diVer
from binding for entirely internally speciWed actions,
t(15) = 0.18, p > 0.9. Similarly, binding in the two mixed
selection mode conditions did not diVer from each other,
t(15) = ¡0.27, p > 0.7, suggesting that the interaction arose
because binding was stronger when both the action alterna-
tive and action timing were selected in the same way, either
Table 1 Mean judgement 
errors (standard error across 
subjects), in milliseconds, as a 
function of mode of action 
choice and action timing
Judged event Selection mode
Internal choice 
and internal 
timing
Internal choice 
and external 
timing
External choice 
and internal 
timing
External choice 
and external 
timing
Movement
Baseline ¡63.36 (10.92) ¡64.22 (12.06) ¡59.83 (12.56) ¡68.68 (12.17)
Operant ¡30.91 (10.81) ¡41.69 (11.04) ¡40.39 (11.25) ¡38.47 (11.10)
Mean shift 32.45 (8.75) 22.54 (9.25) 19.44 (9.75) 30.21 (10.25)
Tone
Baseline ¡16.61 (14.43) ¡29.57 (12.60) ¡30.29 (16.31) ¡25.89 (13.77)
Operant ¡89.70 (19.52) ¡91.15 (17.86) ¡91.56 (18.74) ¡102.75 (18.84)
Mean shift ¡73.09 (16.25) ¡61.58 (12.75) ¡61.27 (16.50) ¡76.86 (12.75)123
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were made in diVerent ways. This is explored more for-
mally in the contrast analyses. The main eVects of mode of
action selection and mode of timing selection, and the two-
way interactions did not reach signiWcance (all Fs < 1,
p > 0.5).
To explore the three-way interaction further, we per-
formed separate ANOVAs for each judgment type. Note
that the overall binding eVect corresponds to a positive shift
in event judgements for action, and a negative shift for
tones. Therefore, the eVect of selection condition on bind-
ing should operate in diVerent directions for the two events.
Indeed, the pattern of binding was essentially the same for
movement and tone judgements. The interactions between
mode of action choice and mode of action timing were
F(1,15) = 7.32, p < 0.05, MSE = 234.03, for judgements of
movements, and F(1,15) = 5.00, p < 0.05, MSE = 588.07,
for judgements of tones. The main eVects of selection mode
of action choice and of action timing were again not signiW-
cant (all Fs < 1, p > 0.5).
Contrast analyses
Contrasts were designed to test speciWc hypotheses about
how mode of selection inXuences experience of operant
action (see Fig. 2). The contrast coeYcients used to test the
alternative hypotheses are shown in Table 2, and Fig. 3
shows the overall binding scores. Hypothesis 1a (degree of
internality matters; see Fig. 2, 1) was modelled by a linear
trend. Alternatively, if binding primarily reXects internal
choice (Hypothesis 1b; see Fig. 2, 1), or internal action tim-
ing (Hypothesis 1c, Fig. 2, 1), then the corresponding main
eVect contrasts should best explain the data. Finally, if
selection mode compatibility (Hypothesis 2, Fig. 2, 2)
determines binding, then a quadratic trend across selection
conditions should best account for the data.
Comparison contrasts that directly tested the diVerent
hypotheses against each other were speciWed by subtracting
the standardized coeYcients of the contrasts included in the
comparison (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000; see
Table 2). The squared correlation between the coeYcients
and the means for each choice condition furthermore indi-
cates how much variance can be explained by a given trend.
As indicated by the amount of binding across selection
conditions in Fig. 3, and consistent with the patterns of inter-
action in the omnibus ANOVA, only the quadratic trend test-
ing hypothesis 2 (selection mode compatibility inXuences
binding, Fig. 2, 2) was signiWcant, F(1,15) = 12.56, p < 0.01.
This accounted for a large proportion (r2 = 0.97) of variance
between conditions. The linear trend testing hypothesis 1a
(more internal selection causes more binding, independent of
Fig. 3 Mean overall binding scores (sum of absolute values of shifts
for movements and tones in operant conditions) as a function of selec-
tion mode (error bars represent standard errors across individuals)
Table 2 Standardized coeY-
cients for the contrast analyses Hypothesis Contrast Selection mode
Internal choice 
and internal 
timing
Internal choice 
and external 
timing
External choice 
and internal 
timing
External choice 
and external
timing
Selection mode 
compatibility matters
Quadratic 0.87 ¡0.87 ¡0.87 0.87
Degree of internality 
matters
Linear 1.22 0.00 0.00 ¡1.22
Internal action 
choice matters
Main eVect 
“choice”
0.87 0.87 ¡0.87 ¡0.87
Internal action 
timing matters
Main eVect 
“timing”
0.87 ¡0.87 0.87 ¡0.87
Contrast comparisons: Quadratic versus 
linear
¡0.36 ¡0.87 ¡0.87 2.09
Quadratic versus 
“choice”
0.00 ¡1.73 0.00 1.73
Quadratic versus 
“timing”
0.00 0.00 ¡1.73 1.73123
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F(1,15) < 1, and did not explain much variance, r2 = 0.0035.
The main eVect contrasts testing hypotheses 1b (mode of
action choice inXuences binding; Fig. 2, 1b), F(1,15) < 1,
and 1c (mode of action timing inXuences binding; Fig. 2, 1c),
F(1,15) < 1, did not account for much of the variance in the
data either (r2s < 0.022).
Importantly, the comparison contrasts revealed that the
Wt of the quadratic trend is signiWcantly better than that of
the linear trend, F(1,15) = 5.55, p < 0.05. It was also better
than the main eVect contrasts, for mode of action selection
F(1,15) = 7.11, p < 0.05, and mode of timing selection,
F(1,15) = 4.55, p < 0.05.
Judgement errors in baseline conditions
The diVerent trial types used cue strings that diVered in
information content. DiVerent eVect tones could be
predicted from the informative cues in the stimulus-based
conditions, but not from the non-informative cues charac-
teristic for the internal selection conditions. In particular,
information in the cue might encourage binding between
cue and action (i.e., S–R binding) and binding between cue
and eVect. Therefore, we wanted to assess whether diVer-
ences between the cues, rather than any diVerences in
action-related binding processes, could explain the pattern
of results across conditions. To this end we ran ANOVAs
on baseline judgement errors (see Table 1). Repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs with factors of mode of action choice and
mode of action timing did not show signiWcant eVects,
neither on judgements of action in baseline blocks (all
Fs < 1.5, p > 0.25), nor on judgements of tones in baseline
blocks (all Fs < 2.9, p > 0.11). In short, there was no indi-
cation that the information content of the cue encouraged
either cue-action binding or cue-tone binding in the base-
line conditions of our experiment.1 Therefore, the binding
found in the operant conditions presumably reXects the
inXuence of action–tone associations on experience, rather
than inXuences of the cues on action experience or tone
experience directly.
Discussion
Our results showed equally strong temporal binding for
entirely internally generated actions and for completely
stimulus-based actions. In contrast, temporal binding was
reduced in the two mixed selection conditions in which just
one dimension (either what action to perform or when to
perform it) was internally chosen while the other was exter-
nally cued. This pattern of results was symmetrical for
judgements of actions and of tones. It was moreover spe-
ciWc to action–eVect binding, since no systematic diVer-
ences occurred in baseline blocks in which actions or tones
were judged in isolation. In short, we found an eVect of
selection mode compatibility in temporal binding. SpeciW-
cally, temporal binding does not reXect internal generation
per se (Hypotheses 1), but occurs whenever both action
selection and action timing parameters of an action are
speciWed by the same system, either internal or stimulus
based (Hypothesis 2; see Forstmann et al., 2008, for similar
Wndings regarding task rule selection).
Internal selection and temporal binding
Our results do not support a special status of internal
selection for action experience. We neither observed a
linear increase in temporal binding with increasing inter-
nality of selection, nor a main eVect of mode of action
selection or mode of timing selection (see Fig. 2, 1).
Instead, our Wndings revealed a clear quadratic trend,
indicating an eVect of selection mode compatibility, as
outlined above.
These results suggest that action–eVect binding is not a
direct consequence of the internal generation of voluntary
actions. Previous studies (Haggard et al., 2002b; Haggard
& Clark, 2003) comparing voluntary self-initiated actions
with passive involuntary movements followed by the same
perceptual eVects did not Wnd binding between passive
movements and their perceptual consequences. However,
the stimulus-based movements in the present experiment
(external choice, external timing) clearly require premotor
preparation and initiation of action, while passive move-
ments do not. The eVect in the entirely stimulus-based con-
dition of our study suggests that simple responsive actions
can lead to temporal action–eVect binding if they involve
eVerent processes related to preparing and initiating active
movements. The origin of the intention to act in a particular
way (internal or external) seems of minor importance. If
binding is taken as an indirect measure of sense of agency
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Neven, 2008), our result Wts with
the intuition that we feel agency for actions and events both
when we decide to perform them, and when we are
instructed to perform them.
Previous experiments suggested that associations
between actions and eVects are strong for internally gener-
ated actions, whereas stimulus-based actions lead to S–R
binding (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002a; Keller, Wascher,
Prinz, Waszak, Koch, & Rosenbaum, 2006; Waszak et al.,
2005). By contrast, there was no evidence for S–R binding
1 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this may in part be due to
some features of the procedure adopted here. The long delay between
cues and actions, and the fact that timing cues speciWed relatively
broad intervals instead of speciWc moments in time may explain the
lack of S–R binding in our study.123
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speciWc action alternative or its timing in baseline blocks
did not inXuence the perceived time compared to internal
generation. Instead, symmetrical temporal binding of
movements and tones was observed in the operant condi-
tions of both the completely stimulus driven and the
entirely internal selection conditions, suggesting compara-
ble action–eVect binding in both selection conditions.
Assuming that the diVerent measures of temporal bind-
ing used in the diVerent studies assess comparable aspects
of action experience, one possible reason for the diverging
results concerns the contingencies between cues, actions,
and perceptual action eVects in the stimulus-based condi-
tions. For instance, in temporal bisection experiments (e.g.,
Waszak et al., 2005) particular action alternatives (left and
right key presses) were either correlated with the preceding
stimulus or the ensuing eVect. That is, actions were contin-
gently paired with the ensuing eVect stimuli only in the
internal generation condition. In the stimulus-based condi-
tions actions were correlated with the preceding stimuli, but
not with their eVects. In contrast, in the present experiment,
each combination of action alternative and timing interval
contingently produced a speciWc eVect, regardless of how
the action was selected. Given that action–eVect contin-
gency has been shown to strongly aVect temporal binding
(Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, &
Haggard, 2009), the perfect action–eVect contingency in
this experiment might have encouraged action–eVect bind-
ing, while bisection experiments might have discouraged it.
In sum, the present Wndings suggest that stimulus-based
actions can lead to action–eVect binding comparable to
binding that results from entirely internally generated
actions, provided that all action parameters are speciWed by
the stimulus-driven system and that speciWc actions consis-
tently produce particular eVects.
Unity of action selection leads to uniWed action experience
If temporal binding does not reXect internality of choice,
what does it capture? We suggest that temporal binding in
our experiment reXects the unity of the action programming
in the brain. On this view, the internal and the stimulus
driven system do not only prepare their “own” actions
(Astor-Jack & Haggard, 2005; Obhi & Haggard, 2004), but
also generate their own action experience. When the same
system speciWes both parameters of an action, this leads to
a more coherent experience of action, expressed as stronger
binding. By contrast, combining information from diVerent
systems incurs coordination costs, with a resulting disunity
of experience.
Although temporal action–eVect binding is quantita-
tively similar for completely internally generated and
entirely stimulus-based actions, the binding could reXect
diVerent processes in the two conditions. In particular,
binding involves both a preconstructive and a reconstruc-
tive component (Moore & Haggard, 2008). Accordingly,
both anticipation of the expected eVect before it occurs
(Greenwald, 1970; Haggard, 2005; Hommel et al., 2001;
Prinz, 1997) and retrospective inference based on the Wt
between actions, experienced eVects, and “prior thoughts”
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002) contribute to
temporal binding. One possible explanation for our Wndings
is that the diVerent selection conditions in our experiment
diVerentially favour preconstructive and reconstructive
binding processes.
On this view, binding between internally generated
actions and eVects they consistently produce is primarily
driven by eVect anticipation (Greenwald, 1970; Haggard,
2005; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997). In contrast, bind-
ing in the stimulus-based selection conditions may mainly
rely on reconstructive processes based on the Wt between
cues, actions, and experienced eVects. If this was the case
then the reduced temporal binding eVect in the mixed
selection mode conditions of the present experiment would
reXect coordination costs when preconstructive and recon-
structive binding processes have to be combined. Such a
dual-mechanism account might also explain why some pre-
vious studies did not observe a functional role of action–
eVect bindings in the control of stimulus-based actions
(e.g., Herwig et al., 2007).
Clearly, future experiments will need to address more
directly the exact nature of the mechanisms underlying
binding between stimulus-based actions and their percep-
tual consequences.
Temporal binding and sense of agency
Temporal binding has been taken as an implicit measure of
sense of agency—the experience that “I did this” (Engbert,
Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; Haggard et al., 2002b),
linking together voluntary (internally generated) actions
and their intended eVects by way of eVerent predictive pro-
cesses (Haggard, 2005). The current data constrain this
view in the following way: Wrst, the large binding eVect
when both selection of action and selection of timing are
cued suggests that internal selection is not necessary for
binding, and, by implication, for agency. In other words, in
some situations we feel as much in control of our actions
and their consequences when we do what we are told to as
when we do what we want. This captures the intuition that
we retain responsibility for own action even when follow-
ing instructions (Milgram, 1963).
Second, the coordination costs observed in the mixed
selection mode conditions of our experiment indicate that
eVerent processes such as those involved in initiating an
action or in predicting the eVect of an action may not be123
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bindings when both the what- and the when-dimension of
an action were prepared by the same system, even though
the mixed mode conditions clearly also involved eVerent
processes. Pronounced temporal binding reXects a “coher-
ent, harmonious ongoing Xow of action processing”
(Synofzik et al., 2008, p. 228). This could occur either for
internally generated action, or for actions appropriately
linked to the external environment. This could explain why
we often do not have a very pronounced sense of agency in
everyday situations that require adaptation to external
demands (e.g., keeping deadlines) and internal generation
(e.g., being creative) at the same time.
Conclusions
Previous research showed that action selection can occur
either via internally generated or externally cued routes
within the cortical motor systems. However, both routes
can produce similar motor output, and similar environmen-
tal eVects: our experiment shows that a characteristic signa-
ture of the experience of action, namely the binding of
actions to eVects, can equally be produced by either internal
or external selection of action parameters. However, the
extent of action–eVect binding depends on whether or not
both selection of an action alternative and the timing of an
action are speciWed within the same system. Most binding
was observed for completely stimulus-based and entirely
internally generated actions, suggesting that temporal
action–eVect binding reXects unity of action programming
in the human brain.
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